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Introduction. 
 
What is it about the Europeanisation of British monetary policy that merits attention?1 
From a superficial glance at the subject, one might conclude: ‘not a lot’. In policy 
terms, this Europeanisation process as represented by sterling’s membership of the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) appears to have lasted a mere two years. 
As is often the case, Britain joined late (October 1990), found the experiment an 
uncomfortable experience before crashing out spectacularly in September 1992. Since 
then, while paying lip-service to future membership of the euro, the Treasury, first 
under Lamont, then Clarke and now Brown, has gone about carefully constructing a 
domestic institutional framework for confronting issues and problems in this 
particular policy area. Most notable in this context has been the decision to grant 
operation independence to the Bank of England to control inflation, as well as the 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank the following for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper: 
Werner Bonefeld, Neil Carter, David McIver and all those who attended the ESRC seminar series introduction of two fiscal rules designed to place explicit limits on government 
borrowing and public debt. Commentators who predicted that New Labour would join 
the Single Currency in its first term, have been forced to revise these arguments.  
 
However, a slightly closer look at events reveals a different dimension to this story. 
Since the 1970s, a number of British policy-makers have been continually attracted to 
the idea of Europe providing a solution to continual difficulties experienced in the 
area of monetary policy. In this context, a gradual enthusiasm for ERM membership 
developed in the first half of the 1980s, to the point where a majority of Conservative 
Cabinet ministers became supportive by 1985. Frustrated by Thatcher’s veto of the 
policy at this time, Lawson went on to covertly shadow the Deutschmark (DM) in the 
late 1980s before Thatcher finally relented in 1990 (Thompson, 1996). Since ‘Black 
Wednesday’, while politicians and officials in Whitehall have been sceptical of the 
case for sterling’s membership of the Single Currency, it is possible to find a similar 
constituency of opinion in favour, including the present Prime Minister. Britain may 
have only formally taken part in European monetary institutions for two years, but 
this picture does not accurately reflect the strength of feeling concerning the 
Europeanisation of monetary policy in some quarters of the British Establishment.  
 
These opening comments raise two issues that often get less attention in the literature 
on Europeanisation. First this case study of monetary policy suggests that 
Europeanisation may not necessarily be a gradual, incremental or linear process that 
increasingly affects domestic politics as the scope of European integration grows 
wider. It is true that one of the common findings of existing work is that the European 
Union (EU) impacts at the national level in a highly differentiated way. However, the 
analytical focus of these studies is often spatial or functional, rather than temporal. 
Researchers on Europeanisation note the contrasts between countries; variation 
between distinctive policy areas within the same country; and occasionally differences 
between different sectors within the same policy area (see for example Goetz and Hix, 
2001; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Knill, 2001). The hypothesis to be 
investigated here is that the trajectory of Europeanisation may also be uneven across 
time: indeed, it might be halted or even reversed in some instances.  
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A second issue raised by the above comments, which is often passed over in the 
literature, is that the impact of Europeanisation can often be controversial and divisive 
in domestic politics. It is tempting to add that this is especially so in the UK and as 
such, the Europeanisation of British monetary policy is a particularly apposite case 
study for exploring these kinds of questions. However, in reality, divisions exist 
concerning the impact of Europe on national politics in all EU countries and it is not 
difficult to understand why. There is a long tradition of theoretical work in this area 
which has shown how domestic political groups have attempted to use Europe to 
strengthen their national position. Intergovernmentalists have described how decision-
making elites appropriate EU structures and policies to by-pass resistance at the 
societal level and force through change (Moravcsik, 1998; Milward, 2000). 
Conversely, a range of other writers have charted how pressure groups have relocated 
their lobbying activity to Brussels, as a way of trying to reclaim or entrench their 
influence on the domestic stage (see for example, Greenwood, Grote and Ronit, 1992; 
Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Schmitter and Streeck, 1994). Put in different term, 
Europeanisation will always have implications for existing patterns of interest, power, 
autonomy and democracy within countries. It would be surprising if this process did 
not generate contention. The more interesting question perhaps, is how such 
controversy, situated in particular spatial and temporal contexts, can be explained? 
 
This paper attempts to do the following things. It begins by discussing and clarifying 
the concept of Europeanisation as it is employed in this paper. We cannot make 
assertions about the Europeanisation of British monetary policy (or the lack of it) 
without first being explicit concerning what we think the term means. Second, it 
outlines Cowles, Caporaso and Risse’s three-step framework, which asserts that 
Europeanisation is a product partly of the degree of fit or misfit between EU level 
processes and domestic institutions. Having asserted that this approach might be a 
useful starting point for analysis, the paper goes on to chart the rise and fall of the 
Europeanisation of British monetary policy over the last twenty-five years or so. In 
particular, it addresses the question of why the failure of ERM membership became so 
controversial and explores whether there is a connection between this episode and the 
                                                                                                                                            
usual disclaimers apply. 
  3Blair Government’s continual refusal to join the euro. The main argument promoted 
here is that Europeanisation in the area of monetary policy became controversial and 
unpopular, not because it conflicted with the institutional realities of domestic British 
politics. Rather, this contention was more the product of a discourse, actively 
promoted by a group of Euro-sceptics, which asserted that there was a ‘misfit’ 
between  their particular interpretation of Britain’s institutional tradition and 
membership of the ERM. The paper concludes by suggesting that this discourse has 
also had an (often neglected) impact on the Treasury’s present sceptical attitude 
towards the Single Currency. 
 
 
Conceptualising Europeanisation.  
 
A burgeoning (and contested) literature already exists on the definition of 
Europeanisation. While this work contains many insights, it often lacks an explicit 
recognition of the issues and problems involved in the task of concept formation 
(Sartori, 1970; 1984; Gerring, 1996). Put in different terms, any statement delineating 
the meaning of Europeanisation needs to be sensitive to certain rules and criteria 
which arise as part of this activity.2 The first and most obvious task is to define what 
a concept means. What are its distinguishing properties (its intension) and what are 
the phenomena it is trying to explain (its extension)? However, we need to go further 
and insist that the properties and phenomenon of a concept be internally coherent in 
the sense that they are logically related to each other. Concepts that are internally 
inconsistent are likely to cause confusion when operationalised, thus providing a poor 
foundation for empirical work. 
 
Second, the boundaries of a concept should be as ‘sharp’ and distinct as possible, 
showing how it is externally differentiated from related terms. Making it clear what a 
concept isn’t is just as important as defining what it is. Indeed, an awareness of this 
issue is crucial if we are to avoid the problem of ‘concept-stretching’ which is 
sometimes said to afflict the terminology of the social sciences. Concept-stretching 
refers to the practice whereby academics take the line of least resistance and adapt 
                                                 
2 For an extended version of this discussion, see (Buller and Gamble, 2002). 
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Extending our concepts in this way runs the risk of generating confusion and 
ambiguity within the language we employ to explain social and political events. A 
similar problem can occur if we are insensitive to the field utility of new terms that are 
introduced into the lexicon of a particular academic discipline. Put a different way, 
new concepts should be a genuine addition to the semantic terrain surrounding a 
subject, not merely an alternative label for the same thing. 
 
Keeping in mind these various canons, this paper proceeds to define Europeanisation 
as:  
 
‘a process whereby distinct EU modes of governance and policy-making are 
incorporated into the domestic politics of the country or countries under study’. 
 
The phrases domestic politics and EU structures of governance and policy-making are 
deliberately designed to be broad. They refer to both observable and non-observable 
variables, including institutions and administrative practices, ideas, beliefs and 
culture. In so doing, the definition is intended to be as inclusive as possible in terms of 
embracing theoretical traditions that might help to explain Europeanisation. 
 
At the same time, inclusion of the word distinct reminds us of the issue of ‘external 
differentiation’. While the EU is a relatively autonomous organisation, it will still be 
significantly affected by events that exist outside its boundaries. In other words, we 
need to be clear that when we refer to Europeanisation, we are not just talking about 
domestic and international forces ‘passing through’ Brussels without being shaped by 
the institutions and processes of the EU. This is not to say that the definition of 
Europeanisation offered up here requires the total separation of the European from 
national or international levels. The key point here is that the EU must have its own 
governing beliefs, instruments and policies and that these should make a difference: if 
its activities in a particular area at a specific moment are reduced to some other factor 
or effect, we are talking about something other than Europeanisation.  
 
If Europeanisation can be conceptualised as the incorporation of distinct modes of 
governance into domestic politics, something also needs to be said about the effects of 
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local level, such a conclusion does not necessarily flow from the above definition. EU 
modes of governance may serve to entrench and legitimise existing domestic 
institutions and policies, making it even more difficult to effect resistance and reform. 
What does matter in this case of consolidation and retrenchment is that these 
European and domestic processes are in some sense distinct. Put indifferent terms, a 
case where national governments or other domestic actors are just using the EU to 
‘feed through’ their preferred policies, which will then be re-imposed at the domestic 
level, would not count as Europeanisation. It might be added in passing that examples 
like the one just quoted, are likely to be rare in EU studies.  
 
Finally, as already suggested, the analytical focus of this definition is ‘top down’, 
looking from the European to the domestic. This feature is in line with many other 
understandings of the word Europeanisation and results from conscious thinking 
concerning how the concept can be distinguished from that of European integration. 
Historically, the term European integration referred to the process of institution-
building at the European level (leading to the eventual establishment of some 
unspecified supranational polity). Europeanisation studies on the other hand, have 
shifted analytical focus to the relatively uncharted territory of how these European 
level processes impact on national politics and policy-making. Interestingly, this 
change of perspective has brought with it a shift in theoretical direction from the old 
International Relations theories which dominated the literature on European 
integration, to new approaches that have borrowed from work in Comparative Politics 
and Policy Analysis (Hix and Goetz, 2001). 
 
What, then are these theoretical frameworks that might be employed to describe and 
explain this Europeanisation process? It is probably not an exaggeration to say that 
the vast majority of work in this emerging subject area has adopted a New 
Institutionalist perspective. Perhaps the defining feature of New Institutionalism is its 
attempt to move away from the narrow formal definition of institutions embodied in 
what some have called ‘Old Institutionalism’. In this sense, institutions do not just 
refer to formal rules, regulations or statutes, which early students of politics spent so 
much time researching and describing. Institutions now cover: ‘…informal 
procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organisational 
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Olson, 1984; 1989). It should be noted in passing that, in many ways, this is where the 
agreement ends between advocates of this particular approach. New Institutionalism 
now contains anywhere between three and seven separate intellectual traditions, 
depending on which commentators you consult (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999). 
In short, this work does not provide a unified body of thought on the relationship 
between institutions and political behaviour. 
 
This issue aside, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse’s edited collection (2001) has provided 
a useful and influential framework for understanding the Europeanisation process, 
which employs this New Institutionalist perspective. When it comes to charting the 
relationship between the European and national levels, these authors suggest a three-
step heuristic device to guide research (Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso, 2001, 
pp.6-9). The first step is to outline the relevant European institutions and processes: 
that is, the formal and informal rules, regulations, norms and conventions that have 
the potential to affect national politics. Step two involves identifying the ‘goodness of 
fit’ between European and domestic structures. For Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, the 
greater the divergence between European and national levels, the larger the adaptation 
pressure and the more likely that Europeanisation will take place. It should be noted 
in passing that this specific assertion has been questioned by some writers. Knill and 
Lehmkuhl, (1999) for example suggest that domestic institutional change is more 
likely in cases where Europe requires incremental rather than substantial departures 
from existing arrangements. 
 
Finally, while the degree of adaptational pressure generated by institutional ‘fit’ or 
‘misfit’ will be important in accounting for the likelihood of Europeanisation, it will 
not be the determining factor. For Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, there is a third step: 
domestic mediating factors operating within institutions, which can shape pressure for 
change in line with local and contingent circumstances. In this context, some writers 
point to the importance of ‘veto points’ – any stage in the national decision-making 
process where agreement is legally required for political reform (Haverland, 2000; 
Sbragia, 2001). A second mediating factor sometimes mentioned in the literature is 
organisational culture. Collective understandings or beliefs held by decision-makers 
can have a relatively autonomous effect on the development of policy, including its 
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(across time and space) as a variable which can influence the way policy-makers 
manage the relationship between domestic and European processes/events (Green 
Cowles and Risse, 2001).  
 
In summary, Europeanisation has been defined here as a process whereby domestic 
politics is significantly affected by distinct EU structures of governance and policy-
making. Moreover, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse’s three step analytical framework has 
been put forward as a useful point of departure for understanding the development of 
Europeanisation. The challenge here is to analyse the ‘goodness of fit’ between EU 
and domestic institutions as they come into contact via the process of European 
integration. The rest of the paper is now concerned with explaining the 
Europeanisation of British monetary policy, and particularly how this process has 
ebbed and flowed over time. It argues that any understanding of the occurrence or 
absence of Europeanisation is not just about charting the institutional goodness of fit 
and adaptational pressure that results. Notions of goodness of fit/misfit can also be 
discursively constructed. Moreover, if actively promoted by agents, these narratives 
can also influence the material reality of the domestic policy process as it responds to 
Europe. In short, future theoretical work on Europeanisation needs to better explore 
the way that institutions interact with agency and discourse.  
 
 
The Advantage of Tying One’s Hands: Rules, Credibility and the 
Europeanisation of British Monetary Policy. 
 
The governance consideration which constrained the behaviour of decision-makers in 
the area of monetary policy in the 1980s was the need to develop and protect an image 
of credibility, especially in the eyes of the financial markets. The significance of this 
objective is best understood against the backdrop of events that afflicted British 
political economy in the 1970s. This was the decade when the UK was known as the 
‘overloaded’ or ‘ungovernable’ polity (King, 1975; Rose, 1979). On the financial 
front, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of semi-fixed exchange rates, and the 
eventual decision to let sterling float, posed an unfamiliar set of choices for decision-
makers in Whitehall. Not surprisingly, mistakes were made, most notably the botched 
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eventually led to a sterling crisis and an application by the treasury for an IMF loan to 
stabilise the British economy (Browning, 1986, pp.71-86; Healey, 1990, pp.426-36). 
More generally, the Keynesian economic strategy favoured by all post-war 
governments no longer seemed to offer a solution to many of the problems besetting 
British industry at this time. Demand management only induced ever higher rates of 
inflation and unemployment. Moreover, attempts to redress these problems through 
the construction of a prices and incomes policy proved to be unsustainable in anything 
but the short-term. These problems culminated in the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’ 
(1978/9), where the trade union movement in Britain is commonly perceived to have 
brought down the then Callaghan Government. By the end of the decade, any notion 
of active government or political discretion came to be viewed with increasing 
scepticism and disdain (see also Donoghue, 1987).  
 
If the need to promote an image of credibility or competence in the area of monetary 
policy was the challenge facing Whitehall in the late 1970s, how did successive 
British Governments respond? At a time when state intervention had become 
increasingly discredited, the Conservatives attempted to achieve governing 
competence through the technique of depoliticisation. Burnham (2001, p.127) has 
defined depoliticisation as, ‘…the process of placing at one remove the political 
character of decision-making’, and in the early 1980s, this politico-administrative 
strategy was achieved in two ways. First, the Thatcher Government adopted a general 
neo-liberal philosophical stance which stressed the benefits of a radical reduction of 
state responsibility for economic affairs. Ministers now argued that governments 
could not manipulate output, growth, and employment (as Keynesians had 
proclaimed). Instead, politicians should restrict themselves to the pursuit of low and 
stable inflation and let businesses working within free markets, take care of the rest 
(Lawson, 1992, p. 413-14; Thatcher, 1993, p.14; Gamble, 1994). This strategy was 
operationalised via various policy initiatives including privatisation, industrial 
relations reform and the introduction of New Public Management techniques within 
Whitehall. 
 
Second, but just as important was the introduction of rules into the areas of policy 
responsibility that the Conservatives claimed they could still control. Rules minimise 
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from interest groups, lobbyists, even individual politicians looking for special favours 
over specific issues. As a result, economic policy can be reduced to the ‘technical’ 
task of monitoring and adjusting various targets within the institutional confines of 
Whitehall. The policy initially brought in by the Thatcher Government to support this 
strategy was monetarism. The governing advantages of monetarism was its general 
assertion that there was a direct relationship between inflation and the level of the 
money supply circulating around the economy, not wage rises achieved by the unions. 
This policy was operationalised by the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), 
which contained pre-publicised and centrally defined targets or rules for the growth of 
£M3, as well as interest rates and public expenditure. Gone was the need for any 
prices and incomes policy and with it, the requirement that ministers get involved in 
the endless negotiations with trade unions that had proved to be so damaging in the 
1970s. Notably, there was no target for the exchange rate when this framework was 
first introduced (Howe, et. al., 1977, p.9; Lawson, 1992, pp.66-67, 1021, 1025, 1040; 
see also Kydland, Edward & Prescott, 1977; Ham, 1981; Barrow & Gordon, 1983; 
Browning, 1986, p.261).  
 
While there is evidence to suggest that, by the mid-1980s the public had grudgingly 
acquiesced in their acceptance of these policies (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984; Crewe, 
1988), the Conservative leadership was experiencing significant problems operating 
monetarism. Both Howe (Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1979-83) and Lawson had real 
difficulties in establishing a reliable relationship between the level of money supply 
and the rate of inflation. Targets for £M3 were consistently missed, yet inflation was 
brought down to three per cent. Ironically, the party’s free market ethos was partly 
responsible for undermining this rule-based depoliticisation strategy. In the first half 
of the 1980s, reforms leading to the liberalisation of the financial services sector made 
monetary targets increasingly unreliable as a gauge for inflation. For example, 
legislation reducing controls in the banking sector encouraged these institutions to 
expand into the personal mortgage market, thereby unleashing a fierce wave of 
competition with existing building societies. The growth in lending that followed had 
unforeseen effects: it led to month-on-month increases in the money supply when 
Bank of England officials had only expected a one-off boost (Lawson, 1992, p.448; 
D. Smith, 1992, p.40). Moreover, £M3 did not even include building society deposits. 
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One of the Treasury’s responses to this problem was to gradually take into account the 
importance of the exchange rate when trying to achieve price stability (HC 21, 1983, 
p.399). By the March 1981 budget, monetary policy was gradually being relaxed in an 
attempt to bring down the high value of the pound which was squeezing inflation, but 
also hampering the performance of British exporters. However, exchange rate 
management as a policy tool also faced implementation difficulties as sterling 
oscillated unpredictably on the currency markets. It is at this stage that a number of 
figures in Whitehall began to stress the difficulties of operating national policy 
instruments in an increasingly interdependent world. More particularly, the growth of 
the Euro-dollar market, and its emergence (in the absence of the US dominated 
Bretton Woods system) as the main institution regulating the flow of global credit, 
meant that domestic economic policy became increasingly vulnerable to shifts in 
‘opinion’ or ‘sentiment’ on the currency exchanges (Bonefeld, et. al., 1995). The 
sensitive nature of the relationship between global capital and national policy could be 
observed in a direct way by the mid-1980s. In June 1984, the pound was dragged 
upwards in the wake of a rising dollar, boosted by figures showing a significant rise in 
economic growth. By July 1985, sterling was falling to $1.10 and threatened to slip 
below $1 after Ingham, Thatcher’s press secretary foolishly let it be known that the 
Prime Minister would accept such a parity if that was what the markets decreed 
(Lawson, 1992, pp.467-71; see also, Heseltine, 1991, p.72).  
 
In this context, the Europeanisation of British monetary policy through membership 
of the ERM became an attractive way of ‘rescuing’ Conservative leaders from these 
destabilising global developments.3 As noted above, exchange rate management had 
become increasingly prominent as an instrument for controlling inflation. However, it 
was felt that ERM membership and the adoption of an explicit exchange rate target 
would lend this policy more credibility, while at the same time helping to counter the 
threat of currency speculation as markets attempted to discover the ceiling and floor 
of an implicit rate. Just as important were the support arrangements that existed as 
part of the constitution of the European Monetary System and which had been 
strengthened as a result of the Basle-Nybourg Agreement. These required central 
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in danger of breaching its margins of fluctuation in the parity grid. Lawson was aware 
that this help was not automatic. Indeed, Whitehall experienced problems first hand in 
December 1987 when the Bundesbank made it difficult for the British authorities to 
buy DM’s in support of sterling (Lawson, 1992, pp. 786-91). That said, there 
remained a general optimism that once Britain was actually in the system, the pound 
would receive institutional support in the event of a sterling crisis.  
 
At the same time, if monetarism had been introduced partly as a rule-based policy 
designed to discipline public expectations and de-politicise the conduct of economic 
management, ERM membership offered an alternative framework, but at ‘one 
remove’. In other words, the Europeanisation of monetary policy was not accepted as 
being important in its own right, but as an instrument for supporting these broader 
politico-administrative aims. As far back as 1981, Lawson was writing about the 
governing benefits of such a policy in these terms. In a memorandum to Howe, 
Lawson distinguished between two types of financial discipline needed to contain the 
demands of societal groups and control inflation. The Conservative leadership could 
operate a self-imposed explicit monetary target, or an externally imposed exchange 
rate discipline. Although Lawson preferred the former at this time, he ruminated out 
loud whether the latter might not be more effective, especially when it came to those 
Conservative backbenchers who had made it known that they were less than 
enamoured by the initial results of the monetarist experiment: 
 
...those of our colleagues who are most likely to be pressing for the relaxation of 
monetary discipline, are those that are keenest on the UK joining the EMS 
(European Monetary System). In other words, we turn their swords against them 
(Lawson, 1992, pp.111-12; 1058; see also Scott, 1986, p.198; Howe, 1994, 
p.639). 
 
Or as Samuel Brittan put it in an article for the Financial Times: 
 
We are back with the need for some kind of constitutional break on the politics 
of excessive expectations and over-promising…The only way of injecting some 
credibility into counter-inflationary policy is an exchange rate objective; and the 
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System (quoted in Scott, 1986; p.98). 
 
Similar governing calculations were being made by the Labour leadership at this time, 
particularly a small group consisting of Kinnock, Smith, Eatwell and Brown. This 
elite accepted the argument that increased processes of economic and financial 
liberalisation now placed significant constraints on the operations of a future Labour 
Government. More particularly it was feared that any attempts to stimulate the 
economy through demand management would be penalised by adverse movements in 
global financial markets. In this context, what the leadership required was a new 
policy framework that would constrain the expectations of supporters and convince 
opinion that there would be no return to the short-term discretionary policies 
associated with the party in office in the 1960s and the 1970s. ERM appeared to offer 
an ideal solution to this problem: this external institution would ‘tie the hands’ of 
Labour politicians and keep them on the financial ‘straight and narrow’. It is also 
noticeable that at this time, many of the interventionist industrial policies that had 
been developed by the party during the policy reviews of the mid-1980s were now 
gradually abandoned (McSmith, 1993, ch. 13; Wickham-Jones, 1995; Eatwell, 1992; 
Radice, 1989; Keegan, 2004). 
 
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider whether the process being described can 
really be termed Europeanisation. That is to say, can we observe the existence of 
distinct EU institutions and policies that have been incorporated into domestic 
politics. At first glance, it might be argued that ERM membership (and the European 
Monetary System of which it is a part) reflects and entrenches broader neo-liberal 
principles of sound money and flexible markets which have come to dominate the 
conduct of economic affairs in the 1980s and 1990s. However, ERM membership 
(with its own institutions and practices) can also be characterised as a distinctly 
European response to the problems of currency management in an increasingly 
liberalised financial system. Indeed, part of the rationale of the ERM was to (in 
Thatcher’s terminology) ‘buck the market’ by insulating European economies from 
the destabilising movements of the dollar. It was this function which, in part, caused 
so much friction between Lawson (who sympathised with this objective) and Thatcher 
(who did not). 
  13 
Moreover, although Lawson resigned first, he won this particular debate and as we 
have seen, ERM membership was incorporated in to Conservative economic strategy, 
if only for a short period of time. That said, we need to be cautious concerning claims 
that this process of Europeanisation resulted in a significant change in domestic 
priorities. Rather, by ‘reaching up’ to the European level and appropriating certain 
distinct European structures, ministers hoped to have discovered an alternative rule-
based strategy for delivering the broader governing objectives of credibility through 
depoliticisation. At the same time, Europeanisation was encouraged in order to 
consolidate the position of the Conservative leadership, especially after the failure of 
monetarism. In this sense, this period should be viewed as the ‘Europeanisation’ of 
British monetary policy, although as we shall see, this ‘statecraft’ did not produce the 
intended effects. 
 
 
Discursively Constructing Notions of Institutional Misfit: Euro-sceptics, ‘Black 
Wednesday’ and the Narrative of Representative and Responsible Government. 
 
Why did Britain’s ejection from the ERM in 1992 become such a controversial issue 
in British politics? How if at all, has this controversy and debate influenced New 
Labour’s decision not to join the Single Currency? Put another way, how can we 
explain the halting (reversal) of Europeanisation in the area of monetary policy? How 
useful is the three-step Neo-Institutional approach outlined earlier in this paper in 
helping us address these particular questions? The argument to be pursued in the final 
section of this paper is three-fold. First, when it comes to understanding the causal 
influence of institutions on policy outcomes, we must not only consider the specific 
rules, regulations and norms which can inform the behaviour of decision-makers. 
Broader narratives or interpretations concerning the institutional configuration of the 
state can also shape the possibilities for action at any moment in time and space. 
Second, one of the reasons why Europeanisation became so contentious in this area 
was because a group of Euro-sceptics were successful in arguing that a misfit had 
taken place between ERM membership and their particular understanding of Britain’s 
institutional tradition. Finally, Labour’s non-decision on the euro can partly be 
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Treasury thinking about this subject. 
 
There is now an influential academic tradition which highlights the important effect 
that domestic political institutions can have on British diplomacy towards the EU. 
Indeed, Britain is often labelled the ‘awkward’ or ‘semi-detached’ partner in Europe, 
and this reputation is said to derive from particular features of its polity (see for 
example, George, 1992; H. Wallace, 1996; 1997; Denman, 1996). Britain’s unbroken 
constitutional development and its tradition of parliamentary sovereignty is often 
mentioned as a variable in this regard (see for example, W. Wallace, 1986). The fact 
that parliament is the supreme legislative authority in Britain, with the sole right to 
make or unmake laws, sits uneasily with the requirement to share power which is a 
continual feature of EU business. We might add that the constraining nature of 
Britain’s adversarial political culture does not help. As Ashford (1992) has argued, 
any attempt by a governing party at Westminster to more fully embrace the 
Europeanisation process would be attacked by the opposition as a sign of its 
willingness to accept a diminution of the UK’s great power status. If we also 
remember that British political parties are internally divided over the European 
question (H. Wallace, 1996), with the electorate broadly sceptical, it is difficult not to 
concur with Bulmer’s judgement that there is a powerful institutional logic which 
frustrates a more communautaire approach to the EU (Bulmer, 1992, p.28). 
 
This paper also argues that domestic institutions are important when it comes to 
understanding the development of Europeanisation in the area of monetary policy, but 
the argument is slightly different. Not only do the particular rules, regulations, norms 
and procedures within the British Polity structure the possibilities for action. Both the 
narratives that are constructed about these institutions, as well as the way these 
interpretations are articulated and mobilised, can also serve as a powerful constraint 
on behaviour. As Birch (1964) has argued, a country’s understanding of its own 
institutional tradition can vary historically and may be essentially contested at any one 
time. Moreover, the words we use to inform the discussion of our political structures 
will themselves be subject to different meanings and appropriated by different groups 
in different temporal periods. In short, we not only need to consider the ‘real’ effect of 
institutions, but the influence of particular ‘stories’ that we formulate around them.  
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Perhaps the most influential story of Britain’s institutional tradition is the one that 
characterises it as Representative and Responsible Government. Two aspects of this 
narrative merit further attention in the context of the argument to follow. The first is 
the continued emphasis placed on the skilful and clever attributes of British political 
leadership. As already noted, Britain’s unbroken constitutional development and more 
particularly, its ability to avoid external invasion and stave off internal revolution was 
compared favourably to the experience of other European countries in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For many, this superior track record was primarily 
the result of the pragmatic and flexible nature of elite rule. Shorn of any long-standing 
attachment to ideology or ‘theory’ and armed with good old-fashioned English 
empiricism and self-restraint, the ruling classes were able to incorporate opposition 
groups or factions in a way that did not disturb the fundamentals of their position 
(Beer, 1982, 110-14). Ironically, the importance of leadership is also stressed by much 
of the literature on Britain’s relations with the EU, but in this case, the verdict is 
damning. The innate conservatism and short-sightedness of the British ruling classes 
rendered it blind to the opportunities of European integration in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The results have been a continued aloofness and ambiguity as London has struggled 
to adjust to an organisation whose design it had little or not influence over (see for 
example, Charlton, 1983; Denman, 1996). 
 
Aligned with this established practice of strong, yet responsible leadership was the 
convention of representative government. Again, we have already noted the centrality 
of parliament within the British political tradition. What is important here is the 
dominant normative view that Westminster should provide the sole arena for the 
expression of interests within British society. Of course, in practice, the need for 
executive leadership has often conflicted with the demand for popular sovereignty. In 
such circumstances, it is understood and accepted that the former will take precedence 
over the latter. In other words, representative government in Britain has primarily 
meant elite rule through parliament not by parliament. Particularly, with the advent of 
party discipline in the House of Commons, leaders were able to control the political 
agenda, aggregate opinion and manufacture public consent. Although, in Bagehot’s 
famous dictum, this development regulated parliament to a ‘dignified’ part of the 
constitution, the importance of this function should not be under-estimated. Those 
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understood this façade of democracy was vital for the legitimation of elite rule. 
Parliament was important, so the argument went, because the masses still thought that 
it was important (Crossman, 1963; Crick, 1988; Judge, 1993; 1999, chapter 1). 
 
The next question to consider how these observations relate to the question of why the 
Europeanisation of monetary policy in Britain became controversial in the 1990s. One 
obvious response is to point to the degree of misfit between European institutions and 
processes and British domestic politics at this time. The Thatcher Government’s 
decision to join the ERM in 1990 had locked Britain into a Deutschmark zone when 
the economies of both countries were diverging significantly. The Bundesbank, 
attempting to cope with the inflationary consequences of re-unification, sought to 
raise interest rates in the early 1990s. Faced with an economy slipping into recession 
after a credit-fuelled boom in the late 1980s, the Treasury in Britain sought every 
opportunity to cut them. Realising the unsustainable nature of Britain’s position 
currency speculators increasingly sold sterling. Lamont raised interest rates to 12% 
(he was going to raise them to 15%) and the authorities spent approximately £3 billion 
of taxpayers money trying to shore up the pound (Keegan, 2004, p. 102). Eventually 
the policy collapsed and ERM membership came to be held responsible for a balance 
of payments deficit topping £1 billion; an unemployment rate standing at 2.8 million; 
and increasing levels of negative equity reported to have reached 6 billion. No wonder 
Black Wednesday was such a controversial episode in the history of the Conservative 
Party from which its reputation for governing competence did not recover (for a good 
discussion, see Stephens, 1996). It seems that the process of Europeanisation had not 
been able to insulate the British economy from the unsettling shocks of the global 
financial system after all. 
 
It did not help that the structure of the ERM had become a lot less flexible as a result 
of certain geo-political developments. The ending of the Cold War in 1989, as well as 
the re-unification of Germany in 1990 had led a number of member states to 
accelerate their plans for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Grahl, 1997, pp.59-
76; Baun, 1995/6, pp.610-12). Further integration in this area, like integration in the 
1950s, was designed in part to guard against the renewed threat of German 
adventurism in central and eastern Europe. All of a sudden, ERM membership had 
  17shifted from a free-standing policy of its own to becoming stage one of a broader and 
more ambitious political project to create a Single Currency. Where revaluations in 
the ERM had been possible in the past, they were now going to be much more 
difficult to achieve. Unsurprisingly, British attempts to negotiate such a change in 
order to aid sterling’s plight, was firmly refused (Stephens, 1996, pp.236-37; Seldon, 
1997, p.311).  
 
However, a more prolonged period of reflection suggests that incidents of fit/misfit 
are not necessarily synonymous with controversy. We have already mentioned in 
passing research in the area of Europeanisation which demonstrates that misfit may 
increase adaptational pressure in a way that leads to the acceptance of EU policies at 
the national level. It follows then that the question of how institutional fit/misfit is 
defined and understood may not necessarily be a simple or ‘objective’ one. The 
subjective judgement of groups (with their own narratives concerning their own 
national political traditions) may also be important when it comes to judging the 
commensurability of European processes with domestic structures. In short, 
understanding why misfit leads to controversy (and indeed, the rejection of 
Europeanisation) requires the researcher to move beyond a focus on institutions to a 
consideration of how they interact with agency and are narrated through discourse.  
 
It follows then that part of the reason why the Europeanisation of British monetary 
policy became so controversial was not because of the ‘objective’ material 
consequences of the misfit noted above. Attention also needs to be paid to the way 
that particular groups in Britain were able to take advantage these problems and 
articulate notions of misfit that were broader and more resonant that the economic 
difficulties associated with ERM membership. The most prominent group in this 
context was the Conservative Euro-sceptics(assisted initially by the Labour Party in 
opposition). In other words, the Europeanisation of British monetary policy (as well 
as its difficulties) was an issue that not only penetrated the House of Commons, but 
divided the political classes at Westminster (on this, see Buller, 2000, chapters 6-7). If 
there is a grain of truth to the view that the function of parliament in Britain is to 
manufacture consent and legitimate executive rule, then the implications of this 
development are self-evident. At this time, the Conservative leadership lost control of 
the issue and the dormant views of the Euro-sceptics rose up the agenda in a way that 
  18had not been permitted throughout the 1980s. It should of course be added that these 
arguments achieved additional publicity from the Conservative press, which also 
turned against John Major at this time (Seldon, 1997, pp.288-89, 707-13). 
 
What was it about ERM membership in particular that the Euro-sceptics understood to 
be so damaging for British domestic politics? Put simply, Europeanisation (in the area 
of monetary policy) not only produced the perverse consequences noted earlier. It 
undermined any sense of representative and responsible government which this group 
perceived to be the substance of the British political tradition – a tradition that the 
Tories should have been upholding in office. If we recall the precise nature of this 
narrative, it will be remembered that it contained two elements. The first was an 
emphasis on the skilful and flexible nature of British elite rule down through the 
centuries. The second was an understanding that, while representative government 
largely meant executive rule through Parliament, Westminster had a vital role to play 
in legitimising this centralised form of governance and the policy outputs it produced. 
Let’s take each of these themes in turn. 
 
What is interesting about surveying the discourse of the Conservative Euro-sceptics in 
and around the ERM episode, is their continual pre-occupation with the possibility 
that implementation of this policy might lead the party to box itself into an 
unsustainable position. During the House of Commons debate (Hansard (Commons) 
Vol. 177, 15 October, 1990) on Britain’s decision to join, Major (who has succeeded 
Lawson as Chancellor) was continually asked whether he had left himself enough 
room for manoeuvre if sterling’s parity proved to be impossible to maintain (see, for 
example, Shore, col. 933; T. Taylor, col. 934). Major’s response was to assert that 
DM 2.95 represented the average inflation-adjusted real rate for the last decade and, 
even if sterling came under pressure, the authorities would do everything to keep it 
within its bands. He added for good measure that these concerns had been raised in 
other ERM countries, but had proved to be unfounded. Not happy with this response, 
Harry Ewing sought reassurance, asking Major once again: 
 
‘…to spell out to the House and the country what powers are available to 
correct his own mistake if he had got it wrong? If he refuses to explain, we can 
only assume that he has left himself without any power (col. 938). 
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Major’s response: ‘…I do not accept the right hon. Gentleman’s premise that we have 
gone in at either the wrong time or the wrong rate, and events will bear this out’ (col. 
938). 
 
Indeed, one feature of the Euro-sceptic contribution to the Cabinet debates on this 
issue in the 1980s was Thatcher and Ridley’s concern that ERM membership would 
place too many constraints on their freedom of manoeuvre. It was all very well to seek 
credibility by ‘tying your hands’ to explicit rules, but rules could become too tight and 
an element of discretion was always desirable in the complex business of economic 
management. In this sense, the problem with Lawson was his desire for a policy 
instrument that would allow him to run the economy on ‘automatic pilot’. It was a 
mistake to ‘hanker after some lodestar, some fixed point against which to measure 
progress and assess the need for policy changes’ (Ridley, 1992, p.189). This method 
of statecraft also smacked of defeatism. It effectively conveyed the message that 
Britain, or at lease the Conservative Party, could not discipline itself and ‘wanted to 
pass the responsibility…to something or someone else’ (Thatcher, 1993, p.700, 707; 
Ridley, 1992, p.188-9, 193; see also Lawson, 1992, p.871). 
 
Viewed from this perspective, the failure of the Conservative Government to seek a 
devaluation of the pound when sterling came under real pressure in September 1992 
was understandable. It was true that this stance was heavily criticised (Stephens, 
1996, pp.212-14; 219). The way that Major and other senior party leaders seemed to 
treat ERM membership as a ‘badge of honour’ was noted with an increasing sense of 
incredulity. However, once ERM membership is understood as part of a broader 
depoliticisation governing strategy, the logic underpinning Europeanisation in this 
instance demanded this type of response. The whole rationale of ERM membership 
was to guard against such short-term fine-tuning that societal pressure could 
encourage (especially after the failure of monetarism). Devaluation in this context was 
almost unthinkable.  
 
Moreover, it is only in this context that we can at least partly explain the Euro-
sceptics refusal to go along with Major’s attempt to blame ‘Black Wednesday’ on the 
‘fault-lines’ of the ERM (i.e. Germany). For example, Budgen wanted to know why, 
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Major until September 1992 to discover these fault-lines (Hansard (Commons) Vol. 
212, 24 September, 1992: col. 6). A number of other Conservative backbenchers 
refused to condemn Germany for Britain’s plight. Policy-makers in Bonn were only 
following their own legitimate national interest when they declined to intervene more 
in the currency markets to assist the pound (see the contributions by Biffen, col. 34; 
Watts, col.40; Baker, col. 57; Townend, col.73; see also Lamont, 1999, p.270). In 
short, the concern was not that Britain was losing sovereignty to some kind of 
European federal superstate. Instead, the charge was that, by self-emasculating their 
own power to effect outcomes in monetary matters, the Major leadership had presided 
over a period of ‘irresponsible’ government. The term irresponsible is used in both a 
factual and normative sense in this context. Not only did policy-makers deliberately 
‘tie their own hands’ so as to insulate themselves from public opinion, but according 
to Euro-sceptics, this was a stupid strategy to undertake. 
 
At the same time, Euro-sceptic discourse made a connection between this 
interpretation of irresponsible leadership and what they understood to be the 
deleterious knock on effects for representative government in Britain. In line with the 
discussion above, Euro-sceptics were clear that the role of parliament was to represent 
the views of the electorate, not to make policy. However, for this conception of 
representative government to exist, the public must perceive that their MP’s were in 
authority, even if they were not totally in control. At the same time, they should 
possess effective sanctions to impose their will if they are unsatisfied with the 
performance of a particular party in office. The problem with ERM membership was 
not just that it had generated irresponsible government, but that the Conservative 
leadership had exposed the ‘reality’ of the unrepresentative nature of elite rule in 
graphic terms. Euro-sceptics feared that Europeanisation would produce a real public 
backlash against British politicians who would become little more than ‘lightening 
conductors’ for popular frustration and discontent (Buller, 2000, pp.157-63). Whether 
this argument had any validity or not is of less importance. What mattered was that it 
was articulated and gained a certain currency at this time. Chris Gill, speaking in a 
House of Commons debate on the Maastricht Treaty probably best sums up the 
message: 
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the classic recipe for failure: responsibility resting with a body of people who do 
not have the authority to discharge that responsibility in full measure. This will 
result in public disillusionment with politicians and with people’s capacity to 
obtain satisfaction through their elected representatives. In the fullness of time 
that disillusionment will turn to frustration and anger, which will lead ultimately 
to the rejection of established political leadership, traditional party loyalties and 
the whole body politic (Hansard (Commons), vol. 201, 18 December, 1991, col. 
415). 
 
Writing on the challenge of EMU, John Redwood prophesied that Britain’s 
membership of this policy would lead to precisely the same consequences as ‘Black 
Wednesday’: 
 
...the electorates will want to make their views known. In this system 
(Economic and Monetary Union) there will be no way of letting the pressure 
out. The valve in the pressure cooker will have been soldered over, and as the 
temperature rises, as people become more disenchanted with the economic and 
monetary policy being pursued, the pressure will build up (Redwood, 1997, 
p.187). 
 
Finally, it is possible to detect an underlying connection between these arguments and 
the present reluctance of the Blair Government to join the Single Currency. In other 
words, this narrative concerning the institutional misfit between the ERM and 
Britain’s political tradition may also be partly responsible for the Treasury’s continual 
aversion to experiment with Europeanisation in the area of monetary policy since 
1992. Perhaps the first point to note in the context of this argument is the achievement 
and maintenance of credibility remains an important governing objective for New 
Labour (see for example, Brown, 1997; Balls, 1998; Robinson, 2000; Balls 2002). At 
the same time, depoliticisation – the process of placing at one remove the political 
character of decision-making – is still the principal method of realising this aim. 
Almost every speech uttered by Gordon Brown and his Treasury colleagues has 
stressed the importance of macro economic stability and fiscal prudence. By creating 
these conditions, only then can the party can escape the charge that it is ‘unfit to 
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half of the 1990s (Rawnsley, 2001, p.38). 
 
However, if credibility continues to be the main ambition driving the conduct of 
monetary policy, ‘constrained discretion’ has become the new philosophy designed to 
achieve it. As we have seen, one of the problems with monetarism and ERM 
membership was the adherence to fixed rules could be destabilising as they were 
undermined by external shocks from the global economy (see also Balls, 1998, p.121; 
HM Treasury, 2002, pp.94-95; HM Treasury, 2003, p.15). However, as Balls has 
noted: 
 
The rapid globalisation of the world economy has made achieving credibility 
more rather than less important, particularly for a left of centre government 
which has been out of power for two decades’ (Balls, 1998, p.122). 
 
The question for New Labour was how to design a framework that allowed policy to 
react flexibly to unanticipated events without harming credibility. The answer was to 
move away from a strict reliance on rules and create a broader set of institutions that 
were able to manage a delicate balance. On the one hand, they must allow politicians 
some freedom of manoeuvre so as to avoid repeating the mistakes of Black 
Wednesday. At the same time, these institutions should constrain politicians in such a 
way that the markets and public would always be confident that politicians would 
never be able to use this autonomy to manipulate the economy for their own ends 
(HM Treasury, 2002, p.95). 
 
In practical terms, this philosophy of ‘constrained discretion’ has been operationalised 
by two sets of reforms since 1997 in the area of economic policy. On the monetary 
side, the power of ministers has been curbed by the granting of operational 
independence to the Bank of England. While the Chancellor remains responsible for 
formulating the objectives of monetary policy (in this case an inflation target of 2%, 
measured by the harmonised Consumer Prices Index), a new Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) of independent experts is charged with implementing this goal. It 
should be added that this inflation target is symmetrical: deviation either side of 2% is 
looked on unfavourable by the Treasury. Finally, the minutes as well as the individual 
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side, the search for credibility has been buttressed by the development of two rules 
designed to remove suspicion of political interference in this policy area. The ‘Golden 
Rule’ states that on average, over the economic cycle, the government will only 
borrow to invest and not to fund current spending. The Sustainable Debt rule 
stipulates that debt will be held over the economic cycle at a ‘stable and prudent’ 
level. The stipulation ‘over the economic cycle’ is crucial here. This condition is 
designed to give Brown a certain amount of flexibility to vary policy in a way 
commensurate with economic circumstances. 
 
Why then is New Labour disinclined to join the euro? After all, in many respects, the 
institutions of the eurozone would appear to be just as suitable for the purpose of 
building credibility in monetary policy. Responsibility for the pursuit of low and 
stable inflation would still be devolved onto an independent central bank. Indeed, the 
independence of the ECB is enshrined in EU law. Under Article 107 of the Maastricht 
Treaty, it is explicitly forbidden from taking any instructions from any other 
organisation or body. At the same time, the Growth and Stability Pact has rules 
designed to prevent national politicians from manipulating fiscal policy in a way 
which affects the maintenance of price stability in the eurozone. In particular, a 
government’s budget deficit should be close to balance or surplus and certainly not 
exceed 3% of GDP (although recent revisions to this policy in November 2002 
specify that this position will be judged over the economic cycle). At the same time, a 
country’s ratio of government debt to GDP should not exceed 60% (Radice, 2003). 
 
However, viewed through the narrative of Representative and Responsible 
Government, it is clear that certain features of the Single Currency come into conflict 
with this understanding of Britain’s domestic institutional tradition, especially in the 
light of the ERM episode. We can begin by highlighting the legal mandate of the 
ECB. To recall, the politico-administrative strategy for achieving credibility through 
depoliticisation involves that act of placing at one remove the political character of 
decision-making. However, if ‘Black Wednesday’ conferred one lesson on policy-
makers in the Treasury, it was to ensure that the mechanisms of depoliticisation are 
conditional and reversible if politicians become unhappy with the results. The 
problem with the current structure of the ECB is that it is too independent. Not only is 
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would requite a unanimous vote at an Intergovernmental Conference. Moreover, as 
we have already seen, it is not guaranteed that British politicians will be able to off-
load blame onto EU institutions if things go wrong. If legitimacy is to work in this 
context, other actors that are affected by the policies of the ECB will require a general 
stake in these arrangements. These arguments can be found in a number of papers 
surrounding the Treasury’s thinking on this subject (Currie, 1997; De Grawe, 1998; 
Financial Times, 19 December, 2001; 10 June, 2003). 
 
A second institutional property which is perceived to affect the legitimacy of 
Europeanisation in this area is the goal independence of the ECB. As already noted, 
the ECB is responsible for implementing monetary policy in the eurozone. Where the 
Bank is different is that it has a policy formulation role as well. Article 105 of the 
Maastricht Treaty states that the prime objective of the ECB is the maintenance of 
price stability: no numerical target for the level of inflation is specified. Initially, the 
Bank committed itself to an asymmetrical figure of 2% or less, although this has 
recently been revised to ‘close to, but below 2%’ (Financial Times, 9 May 2003). One 
problem with such a goal is that, unlike the Treasury’s symmetrical target, it runs the 
risk of producing policy with a deflationary bias. More fundamentally, as long as the 
ECB retains this goal independence, it will be judged not only on its inflation record, 
but also on its success in balancing the requirements of price stability with the need to 
maintain and expand industrial output and employment. Failure to manage this trade-
off successfully may provoke criticism from member states and the legitimacy of the 
ECB will suffer. Indeed, evidence of such discontent already exists as France and 
Germany have publicly exhorted the ECB to cut eurozone interest rates further in 
response to sluggish economic growth (HM Treasury, 2003, p.44; Islam, 2003). 
 
If the institutional features of the eurozone are perceived to pose a threat to the 
conduct of representative and responsible government as constructed and understood 
in British politics, the fiscal rules of the Growth and Stability Pact (GSP) are thought 
to be too rigid by the Blair Government. Treasury ministers and their advisers have 
continually argued that trying to balance the budget year on year could actually be 
damaging to the economy. Politicians could find themselves having to cut spending or 
raise taxes (or both) at the time of a recession. Moreover, such measures are likely to 
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the inflexibility of the GSP from France, Germany and Italy stem in part from 
concerns about the domestic effect of Europeanisation in this area. Looking at these 
events from the outside, it is easy to see why Whitehall might make some sort of a 
connection with Black Wednesday. Moreover, while it is possible to cast doubt on the 
constraining nature of the Treasury’s own fiscal rules, it is clear that their great merit 
is that they will help guard against the loss of autonomy that British politicians 
experienced on 16
th September, 1992 (HM Treasury, 2003, Chapter 4).. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has generated three broad conclusions. First, the temporal path of 
Europeanisation in the area of British monetary policy has been uneven, to the point 
where we may begin to ask whether it has been reversed for the foreseeable future. 
This finding raises the issue not only of how we explain patterns of Europeanisation 
across time and space, but how we understand moments when this process becomes 
contested at the domestic level. Second, preliminary work here suggests that 
Europeanisation becomes controversial not just during ‘objective’ conditions of 
institutional misfit, but when groups are able to construct and employ narratives of 
institutional misfit which resonate with the past experiences of those involved with 
policy. Third, if these first two conclusions are accepted, future work on 
Europeanisation needs to better combine its present focus on institutions, with a 
greater attention to the role of agency and discourse.  
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